H9: Slant is largest in polls financed by partisan funds
Among self-sponsored polls, the size of the sponsor-bias coefficient
should vary with the source of the money that paid for the poll.
The prediction is a gradient: β is largest for polls financed through
Fundo Partidário or Doações Eleitorais (party apparatus / public
money), smaller for Recursos Próprios (the candidate's personal
money), smaller still for Outros (third-party donors). The quantity
of interest is the heterogeneity of β across DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO
categories, holding sponsor identity fixed.
Evidence strength: Partial by AN-006, AN-031 (2026-06-02). No analysis yet uses the
DS_ORIGEM_RECURSOfield directly. The available proxy is the sponsor-identity route split: polls paid from the candidate's own CPF give β = +19.12 pp (SE 6.89, p = 0.006, n_self = 18), versus +8.73 (committee CNPJ), +7.70 (party CNPJ), +6.33 (party-name parse). Wild-cluster bootstrap on the CPF cell rejects H₀: β = 0 at p = 0.009. The direction of the gradient on the identity axis is the opposite of what the party-apparatus-laxer-discipline reading predicts, which sharpens the case for running the funding-flow split directly.
Theory
The framework is Polls as Bayesian persuasion (theory.md §"Polls as Bayesian persuasion (supply-side / Channel A)"). H1 fixes the sender as "the sponsor"; H9 partitions senders by who actually puts up the money. Different senders have different cost functions: the candidate paying with personal money internalizes the full reputational and electoral cost of slanting; a party apparatus spending Fundo Partidário (public money, routed through the party treasury) is a step removed from the candidate and has weaker discipline against pushing slant up. The canonical Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011) setup is one sender with one objective; the funding-source split is the natural empirical proxy for sender heterogeneity in the cost of slanting.
Prediction
A triple interaction sponsored_by × DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO on the spec-3
regression should produce an ordered β gradient:
β(Fundo Partidário) ≥ β(Doações Eleitorais) > β(Recursos Próprios)
β(Outros).
The mechanism is principal–agent: as the spender becomes more removed from the candidate's personal stake, and as the money becomes more public (Fundo Partidário is statutory party money), the marginal cost of slanting falls. Sample-size limit is sharp: 712 mayoral protocols (~4.7%) have explicitly political funding on the recurso side, spread across treatment + control cells.
Competing predictions
Direct-stake reading (opposite gradient). If the cost of slanting is reputational to the candidate personally rather than disciplinary from the party apparatus, the gradient should flip: the candidate paying out of pocket has the most to lose if the poll is exposed as fabricated and so should be more careful, not less. Under this reading, β(Recursos Próprios) < β(Fundo Partidário) is the wrong sign. The route split (AN-006) already produces the opposite of this reading on the identity axis (own-CPF β is the largest, not the smallest), which is why both readings need the direct funding-flow test before being adjudicated.
Selection on candidate type. Candidates who self-finance polls
(Recursos Próprios) may be systematically different from those whose
party pays — smaller budget, possibly first-time, possibly without
a formal committee structure. Any β gradient across
DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO then conflates funding-source mechanics with
candidate-type heterogeneity. The within-candidate FE absorbs this
on the headline axis but does not absorb it for the funding-source
interaction, because the funding source varies across polls of the
same candidate only rarely (most candidates use one funding type
throughout the cycle).
Prior research
The Paraná Pesquisas case is the load-bearing anecdote: Folha (2022)
documented the PL paying R$ 2.7M to Paraná Pesquisas via Fundo
Partidário in the 2022 pre-campaign while not appearing as TSE
contratante on any of the firm's 63 presidential polls, which
consistently reported a Lula–Bolsonaro technical tie while Datafolha,
Ipec, and Quaest showed Lula leading [stories.csv 2022-19]. The
institutional anchor is statutory: DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO is disclosed
per LE.33.II (institutions.md §"Statutory mapping"), so the
funding-source field is on every protocol by design rather than
selectively reported. There is no academic literature pricing
sponsor-bias gradient by funding source — the literature on
sponsor effects in online surveys
[cite:leeper2019sponsorship; cite:crabtree2020sponsorship] does
not distinguish among types of political sponsors.
Evidence
| Analysis | Bearing | Key takeaway |
|---|---|---|
| AN-006 | Supports (proxy axis) | Sponsor-route split: CPF (own-pocket) β = +19.12 (SE 6.89, p = 0.006, n_self = 18) vs committee CNPJ +8.73, party CNPJ +7.70, party-name +6.33. Splits sponsor identity, not funding flow — proxy for the H9 gradient. |
| AN-031 | Confirms (inference) | Wild-cluster bootstrap on the AN-006 route split: CPF WCR p = 0.009, percentile CI [+8.68, +29.47]; bootstrap lower bound sits at or above the other routes' point estimates. The route gradient survives finite-sample-valid inference. |
DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO direct test |
Not tested | Triple interaction sponsored_by × DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO on spec-3 is queued. Field is in hand (pipelines/politica/build/clean/poll_sponsor_2024.parquet); 712 politically-flagged protocols spread across treated + control cells. |
Open tests
Direct funding-flow gradient
Run sponsored_by × DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO on spec-3 with the four
canonical categories (Fundo Partidário / Doações Eleitorais /
Recursos Próprios / Outros) plus a #NULO# bin. The 712-protocol
politically-flagged cell determines the precision ceiling. This is
the load-bearing test that adjudicates between the principal-agent
reading (gradient pointing toward party/public money) and the
direct-stake reading (gradient pointing toward own pocket). Without
it, the H9 page is on the AN-006 proxy axis only.
CPF cell heterogeneity
AN-031 follow-up: with n = 18 in the CPF cell, the bootstrap takes the cell's marginal structure as given. A descriptive look at those 18 candidates (race competitiveness, final outcome, party, candidate experience) could surface whether the +19 pp comes from a homogeneous "personal-stake" pattern or is driven by a subset of unusual cases. Either reading would sharpen the interpretation of the funding-source gradient when it lands.
Cross-reference with the partisan-fund anecdote
The Paraná Pesquisas / PL case is a single firm-year datapoint
where Fundo Partidário money flowed outside the TSE contratante
field — the firm appears as the contratante on its own polls while
the PL is the upstream funder. This is closer to
H11 (pollster-self-cover) than to the H9
funding-source split, since the DS_ORIGEM_RECURSO field on those
polls would not flag the PL money. Worth flagging in the
funding-source paper section as the limit case the registry field
misses.
Supporting analyses
CPF route survives finite-sample wild-cluster bootstrap inference. WCR two-sided p=0.009 against H0: β_cpf=0. WCU percentile 95% CI: [+8.68, +29.47] — modestly TIGHTER than the CRVE [+7.62, +30.42] on the lower bound, meaning the bootstrap is more confident the coefficient is bounded above zero. The +19.02 pp point estimate is identical to AN-006's +19.12 (within PanelOLS solver tolerance) and the other three routes also pass: committee [+6.16, +11.23] (WCR p<0.001), party [+3.83, +11.51] (p=0.006), party-name [+2.03, +10.29] (p=0.004). The §4.4 paper footnote's concern about CRVE asymptotic-normality at n_self=18 is unfounded — the bootstrap inference confirms the route gradient.
When the candidate pays with their own CPF (n_self=18), β = +19.12 pp (p=0.006) — roughly 2× the committee/party routes. Smallest cell but the sharpest signal; suggests strategic incentives concentrate where the sponsor has most personal stake.