Peak β shifts from rank 2 in small munis (+10.14) to rank 3 in runoff-eligible munis (+9.43). Direction matches Cox's M+1 rule (M+1=2 vs M+1=3); bandwagon would predict rank 2 in both. The cleanest design-level discriminator the project supports with current data.

Coordination-incentive prediction fails on selection (rank-1 winners *over*-commission by +28 pp; runners-up *under*-commission by −8 pp; χ²(4) = 169, p < 10⁻³⁵) but partially holds on the bias gradient (spec-3c: rank-1 β = +4.88 pp, p = 0.23, NOT significant; rank-2 β = +9.13 pp, p = 0.01; rank-3 β = +11.75 pp, p = 0.02; rank-4 β = +13.80, p = 0.02; rank-5+ β = +5.24, p = 0.26). The two halves point to a refined mechanism: winners commission polls in greater numbers (resourced campaigns can afford polling) but the slant on winner-sponsored polls is smaller and insignificant — the marginal value of a *slanted* poll, not the marginal value of *a* poll, varies by rank.

Rank-at-commissioning RECOVERS the coordination-incentive prediction in tight races. AN-026's selection finding ('winners over-commission by +28 pp on final-rank') was largely an artifact of (a) eventually-rank-2 candidates being labeled rank-2 even when leading at commissioning, and (b) safe-race rank-1 over-commissioning dominating the pooled count. When rank is measured at commissioning from the most recent prior neutral poll AND stratified by race competitiveness, the tight-margin tertile reverses: rank-1 share -9.7 pp (sensitivity -16.4 pp, p=0.007); rank-2 +19.2 pp (sensitivity +11.9 pp); rank-3 +14.4 pp. In wide-margin races rank-1 still over-commissions by +22 pp. Two distinct mechanisms: coordination-demand drives runner-up over-commissioning in competitive races; resourcing-without-strategic-need drives leader over-commissioning in safe races. The bias-gradient half is uninformative at current n — rank × tertile cells are too thin for clean inference.

AN-027's tight-margin coordination signal is ROBUST across three temporal anchors (date_start the commissioning-latest-bound; date_registered the regulatory-filing moment; date_end the AN-027 default). Rank-2 over-commissioning sits in [+17, +19] pp under primary spec across all anchors; rank-1 deviation in [−2, −9.7]. Sensitivity gives [+8, +12] / [−9, −16]. Pooled (all-races) rank-1 over-commissioning of +8 to +12 pp persists at all anchors. NOTABLE SHIFT from AN-027 in the bias gradient: under sharper temporal alignment, rank-1 β rises from +6.51 (date_end, AN-027) to +7.46–7.84 (date_start/date_registered) and crosses significance (p ≈ 0.013); the rank-3 β is stable at ~+12. The 'winner-commissioned polls show less slant' AN-027 framing is therefore shaded — leaders DO slant significantly under tight temporal alignment, but still less than mid-ranks. Empirical surprise: 26.6% of polls are registered AFTER fielding ends, so date_registered is the regulatory-filing moment rather than the commissioning moment per se.

Money does NOT drive the rank gradient in self-sponsoring. The AN-027 two-mechanism interpretation of safe-race rank-1 over-commissioning as 'resourcing without strategic need' is REFUTED on the literal money-control test. Baseline rank-2 vs rank-1 gap is −3.6 pp tight / −3.6 pp mid / −6.8 pp wide; under log(revenue) control it moves to −3.6 / −3.6 / −6.6 — essentially unchanged across all margin tertiles. log(revenue) main effect is +0.23 pp per log-unit (p=0.16 pooled); rank × log(revenue) interactions are all <0.012 pp / log-unit and insignificant (p>0.17). The cross-margin pattern (rank-1 dominance largest in safe races) is robust to money control. Substantive read: the safe-race rank-1 over-commissioning is real but is NOT explained by campaign-finance revenue. Alternative resourcing channels (campaign sophistication, party support, fixed-cost crossing of the polling-affordability threshold) remain candidates; pure-money resourcing as a stand-alone mechanism is not supported.

Joint test of the two-mechanism story SUPPORTS coordination + reveals money is orthogonal to both halves. Under rank-at-commission (date_start anchor) + race-FE LPM with log(receita) control: tight-race rank-2 vs rank-1 coefficient = **+1.81 pp (p=0.10) baseline, +1.81 pp (p=0.10) with money** — fully robust to money control. Wide-race rank-2 coefficient = −0.82 (p=0.24) baseline, −0.73 (p=0.30) with money — leader dominance preserved. log(receita) coefficient ≤ +0.14 pp / log-unit, all insignificant in race-FE specs. **The tight-vs-wide rank-2 contrast is 2.6 pp** and survives money control. Both mechanisms (tight-race coordination, safe-race rank-1 dominance) operate; money explains neither. Notable shift from AN-029 final-rank: rank-2 in tight races flips from −3.61 pp (final-rank) to +1.81 pp (rank-at-commission), a 5.4 pp swing showing the final-rank coding obscured the coordination signal that proper temporal alignment recovers. Marginal significance (p=0.10) at n_self=32 in tight cohort — direction is clean, statistical power is the binding constraint.

Rank-2 sponsor over-statement does NOT concentrate in tight races as the coordination story predicted. The descriptive cell means show the biggest tight-race amplification at RANK 1 instead: rank-1 sponsor effect jumps from +4.80pp (non-tight) to +12.20pp (tight); rank-2 sponsor effect runs +9.54 / +6.81 across the same cut (lower in tight). Pooled OLS confirms: `sp × tight` is +9.26pp (p<0.001), `sp × rank2 × tight` is −11.99pp (p=0.001) — the rank-2 amplification is OFFSET in tight races. Within-candidate FE attenuates these to n.s. levels, so the cross-candidate cell-mean reading is the cleanest takeaway. The AN-040 rank-2 over-statement spans both close and wider races; the close-race-specific bias is on rank-1 winners, consistent with bandwagon-effect demand rather than the coordination-demand story.