Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
Author: White (majority) Outcome: Petitioners win ($d = 0$: no constitutional violation) Concurrences: Stevens Dissents: Brennan, joined by Marshall
1. Holding ($H_t$)
"The Court of Appeals erred in resolving the Fifth Amendment issue by applying standards applicable to Title VII cases." (p. 238)
"Though the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the Government from invidious discrimination, it does not follow that a law or other official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose." (p. 239)
As constraint on admissible $(w, c)$: The holding establishes that a racially disproportionate impact alone does not suffice to prove a constitutional violation under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. There must be evidence of a racially discriminatory purpose. This rules out decision rules that equate disparate impact with unconstitutional discrimination without further inquiry into intent.
What the holding does NOT constrain:
- The specific evidentiary requirements to prove discriminatory intent
- Whether a different standard applies under statutory frameworks like Title VII
- The application of this principle to other contexts beyond employment testing
2. Fact vector $z_t$
2a. Raw salient facts
- Test 21's neutral administration: "Test 21 is administered generally to prospective Government employees to determine whether applicants have acquired a particular level of verbal skill." (p. 230). Favors: government.
- Disproportionate impact on black applicants: "A higher percentage of blacks fail the Test than whites." (p. 231). Favors: plaintiff.
- No intentional discrimination claimed: "There was no claim of 'an intentional discrimination or purposeful discriminatory acts.'" (p. 231). Favors: government.
- Efforts to recruit black officers: "The Department had systematically and affirmatively sought to enroll black officers many of whom passed the test but failed to report for duty." (p. 232). Favors: government.
- Test's relationship to training performance: "The test was a useful indicator of training school performance." (p. 232). Favors: government.
2b. Dimension mapping
| Dimension | Value | Raw fact(s) mapped | Textual basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 Facial classification | Low | Test 21's neutral administration | "Test 21 is administered generally" (p. 230) |
| D2 Protected trait | Race | Disproportionate impact on black applicants | "A higher percentage of blacks fail the Test than whites" (p. 231) |
| D3 Intent evidence | Low | No intentional discrimination claimed | "There was no claim of 'an intentional discrimination'" (p. 231) |
| D4 Interest strength | Moderate | Test's relationship to training performance | "The test was a useful indicator of training school performance" (p. 232) |
| D5 Means-ends fit | Moderate | Efforts to recruit black officers | "The Department had systematically and affirmatively sought to enroll black officers" (p. 232) |
| D6 Stigma / caste | Low | Test 21's neutral administration | "Test 21 is administered generally" (p. 230) |
| D7 Institutional setting | Employment testing | Test 21's relationship to job performance | "The test was a useful indicator of training school performance" (p. 232) |
| D8 Precedent density | Moderate | Application of Title VII standards | "The Court of Appeals erred in resolving the Fifth Amendment issue by applying standards applicable to Title VII cases" (p. 238) |
Unmapped facts:
- The Court's emphasis on the absence of a claim of intentional discrimination highlights the need for a dimension explicitly capturing the requirement of discriminatory intent in constitutional claims.
Notable: The Court distinguishes between constitutional standards and statutory standards under Title VII, emphasizing that disparate impact alone does not suffice for a constitutional violation.
3. Treatment of prior holdings ($\mathcal{F}_t$ update)
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971)
- Status: Distinguished. The Court clarifies that Griggs, which applies Title VII standards, does not govern constitutional claims under the Fifth Amendment.
- Characterization: Griggs involves statutory standards that do not require proof of discriminatory intent, unlike constitutional claims.
- Model interpretation: The decision narrows the application of Griggs to statutory contexts, leaving constitutional claims to require proof of intent.
Bolling v. Sharpe (1954)
- Status: Relied on. The Court reaffirms that the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component.
- Characterization: Bolling establishes that the federal government cannot engage in invidious discrimination.
- Model interpretation: Bolling's principle is upheld, but the Court clarifies that disparate impact alone does not constitute invidious discrimination.
4. Overruling (constraint removal at cost $C$)
No overruling in this case. The Court explicitly declines to extend the statutory standards of Title VII to constitutional claims, maintaining the requirement of discriminatory intent for the latter.
5. Breadth
Narrow reading (what the Court explicitly holds):
- Disparate impact alone does not establish a constitutional violation under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component.
- The requirement of discriminatory intent remains central to constitutional claims.
Broad reading (what the reasoning supports):
- The decision reinforces the distinction between constitutional and statutory standards, potentially influencing future cases involving claims of racial discrimination in other contexts.
Breadth ambiguity:
- The Court's emphasis on intent may lead to debates about the evidentiary standards required to prove discriminatory purpose in future cases.
6. Concurrences / dissents (alternative admissible theories)
Stevens, J., concurring
- Alternative constraint structure: Stevens agrees with the majority but emphasizes the complexity of distinguishing between discriminatory purpose and impact.
- Key disagreement: Stevens suggests that the line between purpose and impact is not as clear-cut as the majority implies, highlighting the evidentiary challenges in proving intent.
Brennan, J., dissenting (joined by Marshall, J.)
- Alternative constraint structure: Brennan argues that the Court should not address statutory issues not presented by the case and criticizes the majority for weakening statutory safeguards against discrimination.
- Key disagreement: Brennan contends that the majority's approach undermines the protections afforded by Title VII and fails to adequately address the discriminatory impact of Test 21.
7. Reasoning revealing implicit weights on dimensions
Discriminatory intent as a threshold requirement (D3 weight is high):
"Though the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the Government from invidious discrimination, it does not follow that a law or other official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose." (p. 239)
The Court emphasizes the necessity of proving intent, suggesting a high weight on D3 (Intent evidence) in constitutional claims.
Neutral administration of Test 21 (D1 weight is low):
"Test 21 is administered generally to prospective Government employees to determine whether applicants have acquired a particular level of verbal skill." (p. 230)
The Court views the facial neutrality of Test 21 as significant, indicating a low weight on D1 (Facial classification).
Distinction between constitutional and statutory standards (D8 weight is moderate):
"The Court of Appeals erred in resolving the Fifth Amendment issue by applying standards applicable to Title VII cases." (p. 238)
The Court's decision underscores the importance of precedent density and the distinction between different legal standards, suggesting a moderate weight on D8 (Precedent density).