Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
Author: Stewart (majority) Outcome: Massachusetts wins ($d = 0$: veterans' preference does not violate EP) Concurrences: Stevens (joined by White) Dissents: Marshall (joined by Brennan)
1. Holding ($H_t$)
"Massachusetts, in granting an absolute lifetime preference to veterans, has not discriminated against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (p. 271-281)
As constraint on admissible $(w, c)$: The holding rules out any decision rule under which a facially neutral statute that disproportionately affects one gender is unconstitutional absent proof of discriminatory intent. The Court requires that the adverse impact on women must be traced to a purpose to discriminate on the basis of gender. Thus, future courts must accept that disparate impact alone, without evidence of intent to discriminate, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
What the holding does NOT constrain:
- Whether a different form of veterans' preference with less severe impact on women would be constitutional
- The constitutionality of gender-based classifications that are overt or covert
- The application of this standard to other forms of discrimination beyond gender and veterans' preferences
2. Fact vector $z_t$
2a. Raw salient facts
- Veterans' preference statute: Massachusetts law grants an absolute preference to veterans in civil service positions, which overwhelmingly benefits males due to historical military policies (p. 256). Favors: government.
- Impact on women: The preference system results in women being displaced by male veterans with lower test scores (p. 265). Favors: plaintiff.
- Gender-neutral language: The statute is facially neutral, defining "veterans" without reference to gender (p. 275). Favors: government.
- Historical military policies: Federal military policies have historically limited women's participation, contributing to the gender disparity among veterans (p. 269). Favors: plaintiff.
- Legislative intent: The statute was not enacted with the purpose of discriminating against women, as found by the District Court (p. 275). Favors: government.
2b. Dimension mapping
| Dimension | Value | Raw fact(s) mapped | Textual basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 Facial classification | Low | Gender-neutral language | "The definition of 'veterans' in the statute has always been neutral as to gender" (p. 275) |
| D2 Protected trait | Sex | Impact on women | "The preference operates overwhelmingly to the advantage of males" (p. 256) |
| D3 Intent evidence | Low | Legislative intent | "The absolute preference was not established for the purpose of discriminating against women" (p. 275) |
| D4 Interest strength | Important | Veterans' preference rationale | "Designed to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service" (p. 265) |
| D5 Means-ends fit | Poor | Impact on women | "The impact of the veterans' preference law upon the public employment opportunities of women has thus been severe" (p. 271) |
| D6 Stigma / caste | Low | Gender-neutral language | "Not a pretext for gender discrimination" (p. 275) |
| D7 Institutional setting | Employment | Civil service employment | "Applies to all positions in the State's classified civil service" (p. 263) |
| D8 Precedent density | Moderate | Washington v. Davis reference | "A neutral law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact" (p. 261) |
Unmapped facts:
- Historical military policies do not fit neatly into any existing dimension. They are not directly a government interest (D4) or means-ends fit (D5), but they contribute to the context of the gender disparity. This might warrant a separate dimension capturing the historical context of gender disparities.
Notable: The Court emphasizes the need for discriminatory intent, not just disparate impact, to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. This places significant weight on D3 (Intent evidence), requiring clear proof of intent to discriminate.
3. Treatment of prior holdings ($\mathcal{F}_t$ update)
Washington v. Davis (1976)
- Status: Relied on. The Court uses Davis to establish that a neutral law with disparate impact is not unconstitutional without discriminatory intent (p. 261).
- Characterization: Davis held that disproportionate impact must be traced to a purpose to discriminate.
- Model interpretation: Reinforces the constraint that disparate impact alone does not suffice for an EP violation, tightening the requirement for proving discriminatory intent.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. (1977)
- Status: Relied on. The Court cites Arlington Heights for the principle that discriminatory purpose is necessary for an EP violation (p. 273).
- Characterization: Arlington Heights emphasized that impact alone is not enough; intent must be shown.
- Model interpretation: Supports the requirement for intent evidence, reinforcing the constraint against inferring discrimination solely from impact.
4. Overruling (constraint removal at cost $C$)
No overruling in this case. The Court explicitly declines to overrule any prior holdings, instead affirming the principles established in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. The decision reinforces existing constraints rather than removing them.
5. Breadth
Narrow reading (what the Court explicitly holds):
- A facially neutral veterans' preference statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause without evidence of discriminatory intent.
- Limited to the context of veterans' preferences and gender discrimination.
Broad reading (what the reasoning supports):
- The requirement for discriminatory intent could apply to other facially neutral laws with disparate impacts on protected groups, potentially affecting a wide range of discrimination claims.
Breadth ambiguity: The opinion leaves open the question of how this standard applies to other forms of discrimination beyond gender and veterans' preferences. The requirement for intent may be interpreted narrowly (specific to veterans' preferences) or broadly (applying to all disparate impact claims).
6. Concurrences / dissents (alternative admissible theories)
Stevens, J., concurring (joined by White)
- Alternative constraint structure: Stevens agrees with the majority but questions the distinction between overt and covert gender-based classifications. He emphasizes the large number of disadvantaged males as evidence against gender-based intent.
- Key disagreement: The concurrence suggests a different interpretation of how to assess covert discrimination, focusing on the distribution of impact rather than intent alone.
Marshall, J., dissenting (joined by Brennan)
- Alternative constraint structure: Marshall argues that the veterans' preference system reflects gender-based discrimination due to its foreseeable impact on women. He would impose a constraint requiring less discriminatory alternatives.
- Key disagreement: Marshall focuses on the severe impact on women and the historical context of military policies, arguing that these factors demonstrate discriminatory intent.
7. Reasoning revealing implicit weights on dimensions
Intent requirement (D3 weight is high):
"Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences; it implies that the decisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (p. 279)
The Court places significant weight on the need for clear evidence of intent to discriminate, rather than relying on impact alone.
Gender-neutral language (D1 weight is low):
"The definition of 'veterans' in the statute has always been neutral as to gender." (p. 275)
The Court emphasizes the facial neutrality of the statute, suggesting a low weight on facial classification as evidence of discrimination.
Legislative purpose (D4 weight is moderate):
"The purposes of the statute provide the surest explanation for its impact." (p. 275)
The Court acknowledges the legitimate governmental objectives behind the veterans' preference, indicating a moderate weight on the interest strength dimension.