Brown v. Board of Education

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)

Author: Warren (unanimous) Outcome: Plaintiffs win ($d = 1$: segregation violates EP) Concurrences: None Dissents: None

1. Holding ($H_t$)

"We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." (p. 495)

"[W]e hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." (p. 495)

As constraint on admissible $(w, c)$: Rules out any decision rule under which state-mandated racial segregation in public schools is constitutional, even when tangible facilities are equal. Formally: if $z$ has (racial classification = facial, institutional setting = public education, tangible equality = yes), then admissible $(w, c)$ must map to $d = 1$ (invalidate). The weight on intangible/psychological harm from segregation must be large enough to be dispositive when tangible factors are equalized.

What the holding does NOT constrain:

2. Fact vector $z_t$

2a. Raw salient facts

2b. Dimension mapping

Dimension Value Raw fact(s) mapped Textual basis
D1 Facial classification High Facial racial classification State laws "requiring or permitting" segregation by race (p. 483, 488)
D2 Protected trait Race Facial racial classification Throughout
D3 Intent evidence N/A (facial) — Classification is explicit; no need to infer intent
D4 Interest strength Not addressed — The state's interest in segregation is never articulated or weighed
D5 Means-ends fit Not addressed — No scrutiny framework applied
D6 Stigma / caste High Psychological harm; social science evidence "generates a feeling of inferiority" (p. 494)
D7 Institutional setting Public education Importance of education "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments" (p. 493)
D8 Precedent density High conflict — Directly confronts Plessy; overturns 58 years of "separate but equal" in education

Unmapped facts:

Notable: The Court deliberately brackets tangible equality. The Kansas court found "substantial equality as to all such factors" (p. 492 n.9). The holding turns entirely on the intangible harm of segregation itself — stigma, psychological damage, deprivation of educational opportunity through separation.

3. Treatment of prior holdings ($\mathcal{F}_t$ update)

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Sweatt v. Painter (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950)

Cumming (1899); Gong Lum (1927)

Slaughter-House Cases (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia (1880)

4. Overruling (constraint removal at cost $C$)

What is removed: The Plessy constraint that separate-but-equal satisfies EP when facilities are equal — removed in the education context.

Justification (mapping to stare decisis factors):

Institutional cost: The Court defers the remedy to a separate argument term, signaling awareness that the practical cost of overruling is large (p. 495-496). This eventually becomes Brown II ("with all deliberate speed").

5. Breadth

Narrow reading (what the Court explicitly holds):

Broad reading (what the reasoning supports):

Breadth ambiguity (already noted in institutions.md): The spectrum runs from "segregation in public schools violates EP" (narrow, fact-bound) to "any state-imposed racial classification is presumptively unconstitutional" (colorblindness). The opinion's text supports the narrow reading; the reasoning and subsequent application support something much broader. This ambiguity is a feature of the model: the holding constrains $\mathcal{F}_t$ substantially, but the extent of constraint is itself contested.

6. Concurrences / dissents (alternative admissible theories)

None. The opinion is unanimous and joined by all nine Justices. Warren achieved this deliberately — the unanimity itself was strategic, maximizing the holding's binding force by eliminating alternative readings that separate opinions would have provided. In model terms: no competing $(w, c)$ selections are placed on the record, which narrows the range of "plausible" interpretations future courts can invoke.

7. Reasoning revealing implicit weights on dimensions

Education is special (D7 weight is high):

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments... It is the very foundation of good citizenship." (p. 493)

This elevates the institutional-setting dimension. The Court signals that the weight on D7 (education) should be high, making the case for invalidation stronger than it might be in other settings.

Intangible harm dominates tangible equality:

"Our decision, therefore, cannot turn merely on a comparison of these tangible factors... We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education." (p. 492)

Rules out decision rules where tangible equality is sufficient. The weight on stigma/psychological harm (D6) must dominate the weight on tangible-facility equality.

Psychological evidence:

"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law..." (p. 494, quoting Kansas court finding)

The Court relies on social science evidence (fn. 11) to establish that the factual predicate of Plessy — that separation doesn't inherently imply inferiority — is empirically false.

Historical originalism is rejected as dispositive:

"This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive." (p. 489)

The Court declines to resolve the case based on the original understanding of the 14th Amendment. This is not a constraint on future reasoning, but it signals that admissible decision rules need not be grounded in historical practice.