Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
Author: Blackmun (majority) Outcome: Plaintiffs win ($d = 1$: Texas abortion statute violates DP) Concurrences: Burger, Douglas, Stewart Dissents: White, Rehnquist
1. Holding ($H_t$)
"A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (p. 164)
"For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician." (p. 164)
"For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health." (p. 164)
"For the stage subsequent to viability, the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." (p. 164-165)
As constraint on admissible $(w, c)$: The holding establishes a trimester framework that delineates the state's regulatory power over abortion. In the first trimester, the state cannot regulate abortion beyond requiring that it be performed by a licensed physician. In the second trimester, the state may regulate abortion procedures in ways reasonably related to maternal health. After viability, the state may regulate or prohibit abortions, except where necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. This framework constrains decision rules by requiring that any state regulation of abortion be justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
What the holding does NOT constrain:
- The precise definition of viability
- The specific regulations states may impose in the second trimester
- The application of the holding to non-physician-performed abortions
- The rights of the father in the abortion decision
2. Fact vector $z_t$
2a. Raw salient facts
- Pregnancy duration: The Texas statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later (p. 164). Favors: plaintiff.
- Medical judgment: The abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician during the first trimester (p. 164). Favors: plaintiff.
- State interests: The state has interests in protecting the health of the mother and the potentiality of human life, which become compelling at different stages of pregnancy (p. 162-163). Favors: government.
- Historical context: The restrictive criminal abortion laws are of relatively recent vintage and not of ancient or common-law origin (p. 129). Favors: plaintiff.
- Medical safety: Modern medical techniques have made abortion in early pregnancy relatively safe (p. 149). Favors: plaintiff.
- Fetal viability: Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks (p. 160). Favors: government.
2b. Dimension mapping
| Dimension | Value | Raw fact(s) mapped | Textual basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 Liberty interest type | Privacy-intimacy | Medical judgment; historical context | "right of personal privacy" (p. 153) |
| D2 Historical grounding | Low | Historical context | "restrictive criminal abortion laws... are of relatively recent vintage" (p. 129) |
| D3 Level of generality | Broad | Liberty interest type | "right of personal privacy... broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" (p. 153) |
| D4 Government interest strength | Compelling (post-first trimester) | State interests | "State has a legitimate interest in protecting... potentiality of human life" (p. 162) |
| D5 Intrusion severity | High | Pregnancy duration; medical safety | "denying this choice altogether is apparent" (p. 153) |
| D6 Methodology | Balancing | State interests; medical safety | "compelling state interest" test (p. 162) |
| D7 Institutional setting | Medical | Medical judgment; medical safety | "abortion decision... inherently, and primarily, a medical decision" (p. 166) |
| D8 Precedent density | Low | Historical context | "laws were not of ancient or common-law origin" (p. 129) |
Unmapped facts:
- Fetal viability does not map neatly to any existing dimension but is crucial in determining the state's compelling interest. It might warrant a separate dimension capturing the point at which potential life gains legal recognition.
Notable: The Court's reliance on a trimester framework is a novel approach, emphasizing the evolving nature of state interests and medical realities over the course of a pregnancy.
3. Treatment of prior holdings ($\mathcal{F}_t$ update)
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
- Status: Relied on. The Court extends the privacy right recognized in Griswold to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy (p. 153).
- Characterization: Griswold is cited as establishing a right of personal privacy that is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" (p. 153).
- Model interpretation: Expands the scope of privacy rights under the Due Process Clause, reinforcing the constraint that state regulation must not infringe on fundamental personal decisions.
Lochner v. New York (1905)
- Status: Cited negatively. The Court distinguishes its decision from the substantive due process approach criticized in Lochner (p. 117).
- Characterization: The Court acknowledges Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner, emphasizing that the Constitution is made for people of fundamentally differing views (p. 117).
- Model interpretation: Signals a departure from Lochner-era substantive due process, focusing instead on balancing state interests with individual rights.
4. Overruling (constraint removal at cost $C$)
What is removed: The Texas statute's blanket prohibition on abortion, except to save the mother's life, is removed.
Justification (mapping to stare decisis factors):
- Quality of reasoning: The Court finds the statute's lack of distinction between stages of pregnancy and failure to recognize other interests involved to be constitutionally infirm (p. 164).
- Workability: The trimester framework provides a clear guideline for permissible state regulation, enhancing legal clarity and predictability.
- Consistency with related doctrine: Aligns with the privacy rights recognized in Griswold and subsequent cases.
- Reliance interests: The decision acknowledges the evolving medical and social understanding of abortion, reducing reliance on outdated legal frameworks.
Institutional cost: The decision imposes a new legal framework that requires states to adjust their abortion regulations, but it does not mandate immediate changes, allowing for gradual adaptation.
5. Breadth
Narrow reading (what the Court explicitly holds):
- The Texas statute's prohibition on abortion, except to save the mother's life, is unconstitutional.
- Establishes a trimester framework for permissible state regulation of abortion.
Broad reading (what the reasoning supports):
- The right to privacy encompasses a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy, subject to state regulation that meets the compelling interest test.
- The decision could extend to other areas of reproductive autonomy and medical decision-making.
Breadth ambiguity: The opinion leaves open questions about the precise definition of viability and the specific regulations states may impose in the second trimester. The extent to which the decision applies to non-physician-performed abortions is also unclear.
6. Concurrences / dissents (alternative admissible theories)
Burger (concurrence)
- Alternative constraint structure: Emphasizes judicial restraint and the need for clear guidelines for state regulation.
- Key disagreement: None; concurs with the majority's framework but stresses the importance of judicial restraint.
Douglas (concurrence)
- Alternative constraint structure: Focuses on the broader implications of privacy rights and the potential for state overreach.
- Key disagreement: None; concurs with the majority but highlights the importance of protecting individual autonomy.
Stewart (concurrence)
- Alternative constraint structure: Accepts substantive due process as the basis for the decision, emphasizing the liberty interest in personal choice.
- Key disagreement: None; concurs with the majority but clarifies the role of substantive due process.
White (dissent)
- Alternative constraint structure: Would uphold the Texas statute, emphasizing the state's interest in protecting potential life.
- Key disagreement: Disagrees with the majority's balancing approach and the recognition of a broad right to privacy.
Rehnquist (dissent)
- Alternative constraint structure: Criticizes the majority's reliance on substantive due process and the trimester framework.
- Key disagreement: Argues for a more limited interpretation of privacy rights and greater deference to state legislative judgments.
7. Reasoning revealing implicit weights on dimensions
Privacy as a fundamental right (D1 weight is high):
"This right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." (p. 153)
The Court places significant weight on the privacy dimension, recognizing it as a fundamental right that limits state regulation.
State interests evolve over pregnancy (D4 weight changes):
"At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision." (p. 162)
The Court acknowledges that the state's interest in protecting health and potential life becomes compelling at different stages, justifying increased regulation as pregnancy progresses.
Medical safety and modern techniques (D5 weight is high):
"Modern medical techniques have altered this situation... abortion in early pregnancy... is now relatively safe." (p. 149)
The Court emphasizes the reduced intrusion severity due to medical advancements, supporting the decision to limit state regulation in the early stages of pregnancy.
Historical context and evolving standards (D2 weight is low):
"The restrictive criminal abortion laws... are not of ancient or even of common-law origin." (p. 129)
The Court downplays historical grounding, focusing instead on contemporary medical and social understandings to justify its decision.