Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
Author: O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (plurality) Outcome: Mixed ($d = 0/1$: some provisions upheld, others struck down) Concurrences: Stevens, Blackmun Dissents: Rehnquist, Scalia
1. Holding ($H_t$)
"The essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed." (p. 846)
"An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." (p. 878)
As constraint on admissible $(w, c)$: The holding reaffirms the right to choose an abortion before viability without undue interference from the state. It introduces the "undue burden" standard, which invalidates laws that place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking a pre-viability abortion. This standard replaces the strict scrutiny framework of Roe, allowing for more state regulation provided it does not impose an undue burden.
What the holding does NOT constrain:
- The specific applications of the "undue burden" standard in future cases
- The precise definition of what constitutes a "substantial obstacle"
- The state's ability to regulate post-viability abortions, provided exceptions for the life or health of the mother are included
2. Fact vector $z_t$
2a. Raw salient facts
- Informed consent requirement: The Act requires a woman to be informed of the nature of the procedure, risks, and alternatives at least 24 hours before the abortion (p. 902). Favors: government.
- Parental consent for minors: The Act requires one parent's consent for a minor's abortion, with a judicial bypass option (p. 904). Favors: government.
- Spousal notification: The Act requires a married woman to notify her husband of her intent to have an abortion, with certain exceptions (p. 908). Favors: plaintiff.
- Medical emergency exception: The Act defines a medical emergency that excuses compliance with the requirements (p. 902). Favors: government.
- Recordkeeping and reporting: The Act imposes reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services (p. 906). Favors: government.
2b. Dimension mapping
| Dimension | Value | Raw fact(s) mapped | Textual basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 Liberty interest type | Privacy-intimacy | Informed consent requirement; spousal notification | "A woman's right to choose to have an abortion before viability" (p. 846) |
| D2 Historical grounding | Low | Spousal notification | "The Constitution says absolutely nothing about it" (Scalia, p. 980) |
| D3 Level of generality | Narrow | Informed consent requirement | "The decision to terminate or continue a pregnancy" (p. 928) |
| D4 Government interest strength | Strong | Parental consent for minors; informed consent requirement | "The State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy" (p. 846) |
| D5 Intrusion severity | High | Spousal notification | "A substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion" (p. 878) |
| D6 Methodology | Balancing | Undue burden standard | "An undue burden exists... if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles" (p. 878) |
| D7 Institutional setting | Medical regulation | Recordkeeping and reporting | "A report of each abortion performed shall be made to the department" (p. 910) |
| D8 Precedent density | High conflict | Reaffirmation of Roe; introduction of undue burden standard | "The essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained" (p. 846) |
Unmapped facts:
- The specific impact of the 24-hour waiting period on women's access to abortion services is not clearly mapped to any existing dimension. It could represent a dimension related to temporal access barriers.
Notable: The Court's introduction of the "undue burden" standard marks a significant shift from the strict scrutiny framework, allowing for more nuanced state regulation of abortion.
3. Treatment of prior holdings ($\mathcal{F}_t$ update)
Roe v. Wade (1973)
- Status: Reaffirmed in part. The right to choose an abortion before viability is retained, but the strict scrutiny framework is replaced with the undue burden standard.
- Characterization: The Court acknowledges Roe's central holding but modifies the analytical framework.
- Model interpretation: The reaffirmation of Roe maintains the constraint against outright bans on pre-viability abortions, but the introduction of the undue burden standard allows for more state regulation, expanding the feasible set $\mathcal{F}_t$.
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1986)
- Status: Overruled in part. The Court rejects the strict scrutiny framework applied in these cases.
- Characterization: The Court finds that these cases went too far in invalidating state regulations.
- Model interpretation: The overruling of these cases removes constraints that previously limited state regulation of abortion, allowing for more flexibility under the undue burden standard.
4. Overruling (constraint removal at cost $C$)
What is removed: The strict scrutiny framework for evaluating abortion regulations is removed, replaced by the undue burden standard.
Justification (mapping to stare decisis factors):
- Quality of reasoning: The Court finds that the undue burden standard better accommodates the state's interests and the woman's liberty.
- Workability: The strict scrutiny framework is deemed too rigid and unworkable in practice.
- Consistency with related doctrine: The undue burden standard aligns with the Court's broader due process jurisprudence.
- Reliance interests: The Court acknowledges reliance on Roe but argues that the undue burden standard preserves its essential holding.
Institutional cost: The Court emphasizes the importance of maintaining its legitimacy and the stability of constitutional law, suggesting that overruling Roe entirely would undermine these values.
5. Breadth
Narrow reading (what the Court explicitly holds):
- The undue burden standard is the new framework for evaluating pre-viability abortion regulations.
- Specific provisions of the Pennsylvania statute are upheld or struck down based on this standard.
Broad reading (what the reasoning supports):
- The undue burden standard could apply to other areas of substantive due process, allowing for more state regulation of individual liberties.
- The decision signals a shift towards balancing state interests with individual rights.
Breadth ambiguity: The precise application of the undue burden standard is left open, creating potential for varied interpretations in future cases.
6. Concurrences / dissents (alternative admissible theories)
Stevens (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
- Alternative constraint structure: Stevens would apply strict scrutiny to all abortion regulations, invalidating more provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
- Key disagreement: Stevens emphasizes the woman's liberty interest and the need for heightened scrutiny.
Blackmun (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
- Alternative constraint structure: Blackmun argues for the full protection of reproductive choice under strict scrutiny, opposing the undue burden standard.
- Key disagreement: Blackmun focuses on the historical and doctrinal consistency of Roe's framework.
Rehnquist, Scalia, White, Thomas (dissenting)
- Alternative constraint structure: These Justices argue for a rational basis review, allowing states more freedom to regulate abortion.
- Key disagreement: They reject the notion of abortion as a fundamental right and criticize the undue burden standard as unworkable.
7. Reasoning revealing implicit weights on dimensions
Liberty interest type (D1 weight is high):
"The Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages." (p. 844)
The Court emphasizes the importance of the woman's liberty interest, suggesting a high weight on D1.
Government interest strength (D4 weight is strong):
"The State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child." (p. 846)
The Court acknowledges strong state interests, indicating a high weight on D4.
Intrusion severity (D5 weight is high):
"An undue burden exists... if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." (p. 878)
The Court's focus on substantial obstacles suggests a high weight on D5, prioritizing the woman's access to abortion services.