Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
Author: Kennedy (majority) Outcome: Respondents win ($d = 1$: Amendment 2 violates EP) Concurrences: None Dissents: Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Thomas
1. Holding ($H_t$)
"We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause." (p. 635-636)
As constraint on admissible $(w, c)$: Rules out any decision rule under which a state can enact a law that imposes a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group without a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Formally: if $z$ has (classification = sexual orientation, legislative purpose = none), then admissible $(w, c)$ must map to $d = 1$ (invalidate). The weight on animus or bare desire to harm must be large enough to be dispositive when no legitimate purpose is discernible.
What the holding does NOT constrain:
- Whether sexual orientation is a suspect class requiring heightened scrutiny
- Whether laws targeting sexual orientation with a legitimate state interest could be constitutional
- The applicability of this reasoning to private discrimination not involving state action
- How this principle applies to other classifications not addressed in this case
2. Fact vector $z_t$
2a. Raw salient facts
- Amendment 2's broad disability: "Amendment 2 withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination" (p. 627). Favors: plaintiff.
- Repeal of existing protections: "The immediate objective of Amendment 2 is, at a minimum, to repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and policies of state and local entities that barred discrimination based on sexual orientation" (p. 627). Favors: plaintiff.
- Prohibition on future protections: "The 'ultimate effect' of Amendment 2 is to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes, regulations, ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state constitution is first amended" (p. 628). Favors: plaintiff.
- Lack of legitimate state interest: "The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them" (p. 635). Favors: plaintiff.
- Animus toward homosexuals: "The amendment raises the inevitable inference that it is born of animosity toward the class that it affects" (p. 634). Favors: plaintiff.
2b. Dimension mapping
| Dimension | Value | Raw fact(s) mapped | Textual basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| D1 Facial classification | High | Amendment 2's broad disability | "Amendment 2 withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection" (p. 627) |
| D2 Protected trait | Sexual orientation | Repeal of existing protections | "repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and policies" (p. 627) |
| D3 Intent evidence | High | Animus toward homosexuals | "the inevitable inference that it is born of animosity" (p. 634) |
| D4 Interest strength | Weak | Lack of legitimate state interest | "impossible to credit them" (p. 635) |
| D5 Means-ends fit | Poor | Prohibition on future protections | "prohibit any governmental entity from adopting similar... policies" (p. 628) |
| D6 Stigma / caste | High | Amendment 2's broad disability | "classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal" (p. 635) |
| D7 Institutional setting | State constitutional amendment | Repeal of existing protections | "The immediate objective of Amendment 2 is... to repeal existing statutes" (p. 627) |
| D8 Precedent density | Low | Lack of precedent for such a broad disability | "The absence of precedent for Amendment 2 is itself instructive" (p. 633) |
Unmapped facts:
- The specific mention of "general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination" (p. 630) does not map directly to any existing dimension but highlights the potential for broader implications of Amendment 2 beyond its explicit terms.
Notable: The Court emphasizes the lack of any legitimate state interest as a critical factor, which is unusual in rational basis review, typically deferential to legislative judgments.
3. Treatment of prior holdings ($\mathcal{F}_t$ update)
Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
- Status: Not directly addressed, but implicitly limited. The Court does not overrule Bowers but distinguishes the issue of criminalizing conduct from denying protections based on orientation.
- Characterization: The Court does not rely on Bowers for its analysis, focusing instead on the lack of rational basis for Amendment 2.
- Model interpretation: The decision suggests that while Bowers upheld criminalization of conduct, it does not justify broad disabilities based on orientation without legitimate state interests.
Civil Rights Cases (1883)
- Status: Cited as historical context for the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Characterization: Used to illustrate the development of antidiscrimination law and the role of state action.
- Model interpretation: Reinforces the principle that state action, not private discrimination, is the focus of the Equal Protection Clause.
Davis v. Beason (1890)
- Status: Distinguished. The Court notes that Beason's rationale for excluding polygamists from voting is no longer applicable.
- Characterization: The Court acknowledges Beason but emphasizes its outdated reasoning in light of modern equal protection principles.
- Model interpretation: Signals a shift away from historical exclusions based on status without compelling justification.
4. Overruling (constraint removal at cost $C$)
What is removed: The implicit constraint that states can impose broad disabilities on a class of persons without a rational basis tied to a legitimate state interest.
Justification (mapping to stare decisis factors):
- Quality of reasoning: The Court finds no legitimate state interest to justify Amendment 2, emphasizing the need for rational basis even in deferential review.
- Workability: The broad and undifferentiated nature of Amendment 2 is unworkable as it lacks a clear legislative purpose.
- Consistency with related doctrine: Aligns with the principle that animus cannot justify state action under the Equal Protection Clause.
- Reliance interests: Not explicitly addressed, but the decision implies that reliance on discriminatory practices is insufficient to justify constitutional amendments.
- Changed facts: The Court does not rely on changed facts but focuses on the lack of legitimate justification for the amendment.
Institutional cost: The decision imposes a constraint on state legislatures, requiring them to articulate legitimate interests for classifications, even under rational basis review.
5. Breadth
Narrow reading (what the Court explicitly holds):
- Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause by imposing a broad disability on homosexuals without a rational basis.
- The decision is limited to the specific context of Amendment 2 and does not address other forms of discrimination or classifications.
Broad reading (what the reasoning supports):
- The reasoning could extend to any state action that imposes a broad disability on a class of persons without a legitimate state interest, potentially affecting other discriminatory laws.
- The emphasis on animus as an impermissible basis for legislation could influence future cases involving classifications based on other traits.
Breadth ambiguity:
- The decision leaves open whether sexual orientation should receive heightened scrutiny, as the Court applies rational basis review but emphasizes the lack of legitimate state interest.
- The scope of the decision's impact on other state laws and policies remains uncertain, as it focuses on the specific context of Amendment 2.
6. Concurrences / dissents (alternative admissible theories)
Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Thomas (dissent)
Alternative constraint structure: Scalia argues that Amendment 2 is a permissible exercise of democratic self-governance, reflecting moral disapproval of homosexual conduct. He contends that the amendment does not deny equal protection because it merely prevents preferential treatment.
Key disagreement: The dissent focuses on the legitimacy of moral disapproval as a basis for legislation, challenging the majority's emphasis on animus. Scalia argues that the Court's decision imposes an unwarranted constraint on democratic processes and reflects judicial overreach.
Model interpretation: Under Scalia's view, the feasible set $\mathcal{F}_t$ would allow for broader state discretion in enacting laws based on moral judgments, without requiring a rational basis tied to a legitimate state interest.
7. Reasoning revealing implicit weights on dimensions
Animus as impermissible basis (D3 weight is high):
"The amendment raises the inevitable inference that it is born of animosity toward the class that it affects" (p. 634).
The Court emphasizes that animus cannot justify state action, signaling a high weight on intent evidence when it suggests discriminatory motives.
Lack of legitimate state interest (D4 weight is low):
"The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them" (p. 635).
The Court's rejection of the state's justifications highlights the low weight given to interest strength when no legitimate purpose is discernible.
Broad disability as unprecedented (D8 weight is high):
"The absence of precedent for Amendment 2 is itself instructive" (p. 633).
The Court notes the lack of precedent for such a broad disability, indicating a high weight on precedent density when evaluating novel legislative actions.
Equal protection as inclusive (D6 weight is high):
"A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws" (p. 635).
The Court underscores the inclusive nature of equal protection, emphasizing a high weight on stigma and caste when laws create unequal legal status.